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ABSTRACT
Rational Choice (RC) theory has become one of the most influential theories in
criminology and social science with a wide body of empirical support indicating that offending is
associated with anticipated costs and benefits. Although RC theory has been widely researched
and supported, one area that is largely underemphasized in this theory’s discourse is morality.
The present study draws on a sample of undergraduate students from a large southeastern
university using a drinking and driving scenario to extend the RC literature theoretically and
methodologically.
The theoretical results indicate that, consistent with prior literature, morality, certainty,
and severity were directly, inversely related to willingness to offend (WTO). In sum, those with
high morals are less likely to offend regardless of context. In fact, context-specific variables did
not significantly predict WTO, supporting a moderating hypothesis. Consistent with this idea,
results show that morality moderates situational risk such that those who heard about a police
presence from the news were more likely to offend. Morality also moderates situational context
such that with low morals were more likely to offend if they were in an unfamiliar bar.
Regarding mediation, results show that morality partially mediated cost certainty’s effect
on WTO, indicating that punishment of any kind shapes moral belief. Finally, substantive
differences were not found when the dependent variable, WTO, is operationalized in different
ways and analyzed in different models. Taken together, results of this study suggest a need for
researchers to focus on theoretical frameworks that consider context-specific measures, rather
than general measures. Theoretical implications and directions for future research are discussed.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Popularized by Cornish and Clarke (1986), rational choice (RC) theory attempts to
attribute criminogenic and conventional behavior to a calculated choice – a weighting of costs
and benefits akin to any other economic decision (Becker, 1968). Expanding on deterrence
theory, RC scholars within criminology typically consider the perceived severity and certainty of
formal sanctions, like arrest, sentencing, and fines (Gibbs, 1968; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993), as
well as informal sanctions like shame, guilt, and remorse (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Williams &
Hawkins, 1986). In addition, this literature increasingly focuses on anticipated benefits of crime
such as monetary gains, a sense of thrill or excitement, and status (Anderson, 1999; Katz, 1988;
Piliavin et al., 1986).
RC theory has become one of the most influential theories in criminology and social
science with a wide body of empirical support indicating that offending is associated with
anticipated costs and benefits (Anwar & Loughran, 2011; Gibbs, 1968; Grasmick & Bursik,
1990; Grasmick & Green, 1980; Klepper & Nagin, 1989; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Piliavin et
al., 1986; Saltzman et al., 1982), and that findings are generalizable across key subgroups and
offending outcomes (Chalfin, & Wilson, 2016; Loughran, Paternoster). Although RC theory has
been widely researched and supported, one area that is largely underemphasized in this theory’s
discourse is morality. The theory’s early origins hail from Adam Smith’s (1776) assertion that
self-interest guides human behavior; an assumption which persists today. In fact, in his 2013
Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology, Agnew (2014) highlighted that it
was time for the field to expand its core self-interest assumption to recognize social concern.
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This is not to say, however, that RC scholars have completely ignored heterogeneity in
social concern, as there has been at least two key advances in RC scholarship that consider
morality. The first is theoretical, as RC researchers have assessed the relationship between
morality and offending through considering morality as both a direct informal cost of crime
(Antonaccio & Tittle, 2008; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, 1994), as a moderator of rational choice
inputs such as perceived risk of sanctioning, certainty of arrest, and severity of punishment
(Gallup & Baron, 2014; Grasmick & Green, 1980, 1981; Pogarsky, 2002; Wikström, 2004), and
as a mediator of these RC inputs (Ishoy, 2017; Svensson et al., 2013). However, there are mixed
findings and a lack of consensus as to the role of morality within this framework – a key gap in
the literature that this study seeks to address.
The second key advancement is methodological, as RC scholars have utilized analytical
techniques to account for the large number of individuals who report they are unwilling to
offend, which will be referred to within this context as the “zero-chance” phenomenon. These
techniques include log transforming (Gallupe & Baron, 2014; Shelmon et al., 2011) and
dichotomizing the dependent variable (0=no willingness to offend; 1=some willingness to
offend) (Bachman, Paternoster, & Ward, 1992; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993). Though these
authors “solve” the methodological “zero-chance” issue, they do so without considering how
these manipulations affect substantive findings nor discussing the implications of these
manipulations for criminological theory. In fact, no known prior research has considered the role
of morality and these various methodological techniques in a unified framework – this could be
an explanation for the lack of consistent findings. This is another limitation this research seeks to
address.
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The present study draws on a sample of undergraduate students from a large southeastern
university to extend the RC literature in two important ways. First, this paper seeks to evaluate
the relationship between morality and offending and assess the conditional effects of morality on
RC theory constructs. Second, because prior studies have been inconsistent in their
manipulations of the offending outcome to address the large number of individuals who are
unwilling to offend, this paper seeks to determine if substantive conclusions differ based on the
operationalization of the dependent variable. The following sections will first offer a theoretical
discussion on the role of morality in RC theory. A review of the extant research will then be
provided, as well as a description of the current study’s sample, methodology, and analytic plan.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
The Role of Morality in Offender Decision-Making
The idea that those who have a high level of morality are less likely to offend is present
in many areas of criminological theory. One of the most prominent areas is within theories of
social control since Hirschi (1969) suggested that morality is a component of the social bonding,
incorporated through the element belief. He specifically argued that there is a single, moral norm
and belief, and heterogeneity in the extent to which an individual is socialized to adopt it. He
further suggested that those with a stronger belief in moral norms are less likely to deviate,
stating:
“It is an oversimplification to say, however, that strain theory assumes a moral
man while control theory assumes an amoral man. Control theory merely
assumes variation in morality: for some men, considerations of morality are
important; for others they are not. Because his perspective allows him to free
some men from moral sensitivities, the control theorist is likely to shift to a
second line of social control – to the rational, calculational component in
conformity and deviation. This emphasis on calculation is reflected in recent
proposals by theories operating from within this perspective.” (p.11)
The idea that morality is correlated with offending has been empirically supported (Antonaccio
& Tittle, 2008; Bandura et al, 2001; Blasi, 1980; Burkett & Ward, 1993; Cochran, 2016; Gallupe
& Baron, 2010; Gregg et al., 1994; Hannon et al, 2001; Hindelang, 1974; Mears et al, 1998;
Nelson et al., 1990; Palmer & Hollin, 1998; 2000; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Pelton et al,
2004; Piquero et al., 2016; Rogers et al, 2006; Silver & Silver, 2020; Svensson, 2015; Thurman,
1984).
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While these studies focused largely on assessing the relationship between morality and
offending, specifically in deterrence frameworks (Erickson, 1962; Gibbs, 1968; Grasmick &
Green, 1980; Tittle, 1977), other studies have focused on integrating morality into a rational
choice framework. Nagin and Paternoster (1993) were among the first to formally do so, through
testing the strength of individual-level factors and situational contexts on offending. They
focused on possible informal sanctions like morality level and social attachments, deterrence
variables like perceived certainty and severity, and the feeling of “fun” as an intrinsic benefit.
Their findings showed evidence that morality should be included within RC theory because
perceived formal and informal sanctions (like self-imposed shame) together “effectively
controlled respondent’s intentions to offend” (p. 489). In a later study, Nagin and Paternoster
(1994) also found significant effects of individual differences in morality level on criminal
propensity. Together, both studies suggest that morality should be included in studies of RC.1
While Nagin and Paternoster’s (1993, 1994) work exemplifies the need to include
varying morality in a RC framework, other scholars have also argued morality should be a key
consideration. For instance, research has followed Agnew’s (2014) advice to consider more than
just self-interest. In his account, Agnew suggests that people have “social concern” for the wellbeing of others. Some themes that emerge from this growing literature include 1) caring about
the welfare of others; 2) craving emotional ties to others; and 3) conforming to the behavior of
others and following moral insights. While these ideas are broader than self-interest, they
encompass the very nature of RC theory. Adhering to a strict moral code may operate within the

1Relatedly,

feelings of guilt, remorse, and shame influence the decision to offend, something that
Braithwaite (1989) referred to as “pangs of conscience”.
5

costs and benefits framework of RC theory; people may view sacrificing their morals as a cost to
offending and some will see the beneficial effects of upholding their morals.
Consistent with Agnew’s (2014) plea, Paternoster, Jaynes, and Wilson (2017) tested the
relationship between pro-social preferences and willingness to offend. They found that selfinterested participants were more willing to offend and that “acting in a strictly self-interested
way” (p. 860) was related to a higher level of willingness to offend. Later, Jaynes and Loughran
(2019) explored whether differences in social concern were able to distinguish offenders from
non-offenders. While their results did not support the notion that prosocial preferences were the
underlying difference between these two groups, their work illustrates the need to move past
focusing exclusively on the costs and benefits traditionally considered within RC theory and the
need to focus on the role of heterogeneity in morality in offender decision-making research.
Morality as a Moderator
While the literature has established that violating one’s morality can be a perceived as a
social cost of offending (Antonnacio & Tittle, 2008; Bachman et al., 1992; Bandura et al., 2001;
Burkett & Ward, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick & Green, 1981; Palmer, 2003;
Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Tittle, 1977), RC scholars have also considered the ways in which
morality influences other cost-benefit considerations, evaluating morality as a moderating
variable. This is perhaps most exemplified within deterrence research (Svensson, 2015). For
example, over 45 years ago, Andenaes (1974) proposed a typology that detailed the varying
effectiveness of traditional deterrent tenets for those who are morally guided and who are,
therefore, restrained extralegally rather than by legal sanctions—an area of inquiry that is now
commonly referred to as differential deterrence.
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Consistently, Grasmick and Green (1980, 1981) reported that the deterrence literature
was turning to a conditional hypothesis that the threat of legal sanctions is only effective among
those who have lower morals. Consistently, individuals who are morally committed to upholding
the law are not directly deterred by the punishments of crime because the punishments are
ultimately irrelevant. Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward (1992) further explored the effect of
formal sanctions, informal sanctions, and moral beliefs on willingness to offend in criminal
opportunity scenarios. They clarified that they “do not view moral commitments as a type of
cost” but that “behavior may be guided and influenced” by its factors (p. 347). Their findings
suggest that moral evaluations of conduct may condition the utilitarian effects, showing that “the
threat of formal punishment had no effect on the respondent’s projection of committing sexual
assault” when the respondent had high morals. Alternatively, those who had low moral beliefs
were deterred by the threat of formal sanctions rather than their self-inflicted controls, suggesting
that the cost-benefit analysis is more important for these respondents. Further, although a
deterrent effect existed for the perceived risk of sanctions, moral beliefs were a stronger source
of social control than perceived risk of social sanctions, and the threat of formal sanctions was
severely minimized with respondents who had higher morality levels. This finding suggests the
need to move past focusing purely on the effect of deterrence without considerations of morality
influencing the RC calculus.
A more recent study also focused on morality as a moderator of deterrability (Gallup &
Baron, 2014). Analyzing survey responses from 300 youths, the authors found that morality was
a direct predictor of future drug use. Morality was also a stronger predictor than self-control and
perceived certainty on future drug use. They also found that, in general, morality and deterrent
effects operated independently from each other. Notably, however, one key finding shows that
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the effect of perceived certainty was influenced by morality level such that the deterrent effect on
drug use was stronger for those with higher moral levels. This specific finding is in direct
opposition to previous findings of morality’s effect on deterrence (Bachman, Paternoster, &
Ward, 1992; Grasmick & Green, 1980, 1981).
Gallup and Baron used a broad measure of morality compared to other scholars in
deterrence literature; this change might account for the contrasting findings. They measured
morality by asking how wrong it is to break the law, if you should break the law knowing you
could get away with it, and how important it is to obey all laws. While these questions certainly
capture some aspects of morality, they are lacking specifications and context. In other words, an
individual might respond that it is very wrong to break the law but could ultimately change their
answer if given a specific example. “Breaking the law” is a vague concept, and there will be
much variation between “speeding is wrong” and “murder is wrong.” Gallup and Baron’s
morality measure might overlook some nuanced responses by excluding context (Wikström,
2004).
Also focusing on morality’s role in deterrability, Pogarsky (2002) highlighted that not
every offender is deterred by the same threats or at all. Morality and a belief in the law affect an
offender’s cost-benefit considerations. To illustrate this, he categorized offenders based on their
level of deterrability. One of the typologies, the acute conformists, are deterred by the threat of
extralegal sanctions, such as social disapproval and shame. Therefore, a moral objection, often in
the form of self-disapproval, deters the acute conformist rather than the threat of legal
sanctioning. Pogarsky tested this notion and found that acute conformists reported selfdisapproval scores “at least 33% higher than those of the other two groups” (p. 441). The idea
here is that acute conformists comply with the law because of extralegal influences such as
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morality; the threat of formal sanctions is ultimately insignificant in the RC setting to the acute
conformists because their morality level causes them to more heavily focus on informal
sanctions. Pogarsky’s typologies are integral to the understanding of offender differential
deterrability and, by extension, the decision-making process.
While these scholars have studied the moderating effects of morality on offending,
Wikström (2004, 2006) contributed to this literature by overtly underscoring that morality is a
part of the decision-making process. Wikström outlined that morality often acts as a filter; people
do not see crime as a viable action and, therefore, do not consider the costs and benefits of crime
that are most traditionally emphasized within RC theory. Those who do see crime as an option
will experience the costs and benefit calculus, resulting in a two-step decision making process:
the offender will 1) see crime as an opportunity and 2) consider the costs and benefits of the
crime to make a decision. Wikström asserts that those with higher levels of morality do not see
crime as an action opportunity and, therefore, are not tempted to commit. That is, morality
negates an individual’s need to weigh the costs and benefits of an offense.
Empirical tests of Wikström’s theory demonstrate this moderating effect of morality on
the decision-making process. Some findings show that perceived certainty and severity are not
significant for those with high morals (Barton-Crosby & Hirtenlehner, 2020; Wikström &
Svensson, 2008; Wright, Caspi, Moffit, & Paternoster, 2004). Some studies suggest morality
affects perceived certainty only (Piquero et al., 2016), while others show mixed (Cochran, 2015;
Schepers & Reinecke, 2015; Pauwels, Svensson, & Hirtenlehner, 2018). Ultimately, there is
some evidence that morality moderates the facets of the decision-making process, although the
findings are inconsistent.
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Although empirical evidence suggests that morality plays some role in the decision to
offend, where or how morality fits into rational choice is not fully explained or agreed upon. In
addition, most individual differences research focuses on how morality affects deterrence
constructs (e.g., Gallupe & Baron, 2014; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, 1994) rather than the effects
of morality on the benefits and other perceived costs of offending. This study seeks to fill the gap
in the literature by moving beyond a deterrence focus to investigate the effects of morality within
a broader RC context.
Morality as a Mediator
While scholars have analyzed the direct and moderating effects of morality on offending,
morality might also mediate the effects of perceived certainty, severity, and benefits on WTO.
For example, if the perceived certainty and severity of an offense are high, then one’s moral
outlook of that crime may be negative. In other words, the perceived certainty and severity cause
the individual to have high morals about committing that crime. This high morality then
decreases WTO. Figure 1 depicts this hypothesized mediating relationship in more detail.
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Figure 1. Mediation Models.

A theoretical explanation of this mediating relationship comes from the idea of moral
condemnation. Though often rooted in religious beliefs (Burkett & Ward, 1993), moral
condemnation can also be self-inducing. This latter idea is best known as the arousal hypothesis
(Cheng, Ottati, & Price, 2013). This hypothesis posits that “arousal may be misattributed,
intensifying the perceived immorality of the target’s behavior” (p. 1013). In an offending
context, one’s perceived certainty and severity might activate one’s moral compass, causing
them to determine that a specific act is immoral (assuming that the perceived certainty and
severity are high).
Some scholars have tested these mediating effects of morality on willingness to offend.
For example, Ishoy (2017) investigated the mediating effects of morality through parental
monitoring on juvenile offending patterns. While morality did not have a mediating effect on
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violent crime, it did mediate the effects for property offending. These mixed results make sense
within their sample because property crime is more accessible to teens, whereas most would not
immediately turn to violent crime. In this case, parental monitoring served as the certainty
construct akin to rational choice; because their parents are monitoring them closely this increases
the certainty of detection. The increased certainty then signals that society views this act as
immoral, and the teen perceives violent crime to be immoral, which ultimately decreases their
likelihood of offending. In contrast, parental monitoring of property crimes is lower than violent
crime, signaling to the teen that this act is more moral than violent crime. This decreased
certainty causes a lower morality, indicating a higher likelihood of offending. Svensson et al.
(2013) also found similar mediating effects, where shame and guilt mediated the effects of
parental monitoring on juvenile offending.
To my knowledge, this study will be among the first to test the possible mediating effects
of morality directly on RC constructs like anticipated certainty, severity, and benefits, rather than
the use of parallel measures like parental monitoring.
Addressing the “Zero-Chance” Phenomenon and Methodological Implications
To evaluate offender decision-making within a RC context, scholars have often employed
a vignette survey methodology (e.g., Anwar & Loughran et al., 2011; Bachman et al., 1992;
Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, 1994; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996), where the outcome is one’s
hypothetical willingness to offend (WTO). Though some scholars have questioned the use of
self-report surveys as a valid measure of intent to offend (Huzinga & Elliott, 1986; Loughran,
Paternoster, & Thomas, 2014; West & Farrington, 1977), self-report surveys are generally
considered to be an acceptable measure of WTO (See Thornbury & Krohn, 2000 for an
overview), especially when the populations being surveyed are “generally not seriously
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delinquent populations.” (Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weis, 1981, p. 10). Typically, after reading a
hypothetical scenario, respondents are asked to evaluate their willingness to engage in a crime on
a scale of 0 (no chance) to 100 (100% chance).2 This methodology is appealing for several
reasons. First, scenarios give much needed context for the decision to offend. Second, within this
detailed context of offending, researchers can randomize key RC perceptions which may
influence the decision to offend – improving causal inference. Finally, measuring perceived costs
and benefits of offending in a detailed context avoids the need to parse out temporal order often
seen in cross sectional studies (Exum & Bouffard, 2010).
While there is often variation in the WTO distribution, there is also often a notable high
density at zero – individuals who indicate there is no chance that they would offend regardless of
the context. In the present study, I designate this density as the “zero-chance phenomenon.” This
phenomenon may be particularly common among university convenience samples frequently
employed within this literature (Bachman et al., 1992; Cochran, 2016; Nagin & Paternoster,
1993, 1994; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Paternoster et al., 2017; Pogarsky, 2007; Saltzman et
al., 1982). Because RC theory’s foundation rests on the assumption of self-interest, those who
are unwilling to offend, even when the costs are manipulated to be low and the benefits to be
high, are particularly noteworthy and provide some indication that morality may play a role in
one’s WTO (Bachman, Paternoster & Ward, 1992; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, 1994).
Though prior studies do not always describe the distribution of their dependent variable
in detail (Anderson et al, 1983; Anwar & Loughran, 2011; Paternoster et al., 2017), there are

2While

some scholars have measured WTO on a 0-100 scale (Anderson et al., 1983; Exum &
Bouffard, 2010; Paternoster et al., 2017; Pogarsky, 2002; Rossi et al., 1974), others have
employed a 0-10 scale (Anwar & Loughran, 2011; Bachman et al., 1992; Nagin & Paternoster,
1993, 1994; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996).
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examples of prior research observing this zero-chance phenomenon. For instance, Bachman,
Paternoster, and Ward (1992) employed a sexual assault scenario to student respondents using a
WTO outcome (0=no likelihood at all; 10=definitely would) while experimentally manipulating
vignette characteristics. Notably, 17% of their respondents indicated that there was “no chance”
of committing the offense. Nagin and Paternoster (1993, 1994) utilized a scenario-based
methodology amongst a college student sample and found an even larger proportion of “no
chance” responses for their drinking and driving scenario (63%). Also, nearly 30% of
respondents in Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) and 33% of respondents in Pogarsky’s (2002)
tests of WTO reported that they were not willing to offend.
The “zero-chance phenomenon” creates a methodological problem for regression
analysis. For instance, ordinary least squares (OLS) models are often used for analyzing morality
and WTO (Antonaccio & Tittle, 2008; Bachman et al., 1992; Cochran, 2016; Gallupe & Baron,
2014; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Svensson, 2015) OLS models carry the assumption that the
error terms are normally distributed around the regression line, minimizing the sum of the
squared errors (Currit, 2002). However, with data that has a large number of 0s, this assumption
is often violated. The model is also restricted in that it cannot assume negative values and
estimates strictly linear relationships. However, it is likely that the predictors of the zero-chance
phenomenon differ from predictors of other transitions in the WTO scale. That is, the predictors
of why individuals would never offend (0%) relative to some willingness to offend (e.g., 1%) are
likely distinct from the predictors of why individuals would place their willingness to offend at a
six, instead of at a five. The one unit increase between 0% and 1% may also be explained by
different factors than a one unit increase between 50% and 51%. Therefore, vignette data is most
likely nonlinear. Fitting nonlinear data to a linear-assumed model is problematic because it
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constrains coefficients to reflect a single average association, which may not be reflective of the
non-linear differences in effect across the WTO distribution (Weisburd & Britt, 2014).
To address these concerns, scholars have turned to tobit models (Cochran, 2016; Nagin &
Paternoster, 1993, 1994), a type of censored regression model that labels values based on their
location above (or below) a determined cut off value (Wooldridge, 2010). An OLS regression
could predict negative values because it fails to capture that a zero response is a true zero at the
clustered cite (Osgood & Finken, 2002). Tobit models, however, account for the high density of
responses at one end by cut off values at the 0 marker. That way, its predicted values will more
accurately represent offending patterns (Osgood & Finken, 2002).
While tobit models can tackle the zero-chance phenomenon and provide more accurate
predicted values without violating an OLS assumption, they also operate under strong
assumptions: normality, proportionality, and homoskedasticity. A recent study suggests that selfreport data almost always violates these assumptions (Wilson et al., 2020), resulting in biased
and inconsistent estimates. In fact, in running simulation analyses, Wilson et al. (2020, p. 254)
found that tobit models are the most popular model used with censored data regardless of the
assumption violations, further highlighting that “scholars in our field should… be more aware of
the substantial bias in tobit coefficients when model assumptions are violated.” More
importantly, WTO measures are not censored. That is, the zero responses reflect an actual
absence of willingness, rather than an end to the WTO scale—one cannot have negative
willingness. In sum, while the use of tobit models represent a methodological advancement in
attempting to address the high density of zeros, there are still estimate and measurement
concerns that scholars should address.
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Another way that scholars have addressed OLS assumption violations like non-normality
is through log transformations (Burkett & Ward, 1993; Paternoster, Jaynes, & Wilson, 2017).
Logging an outcome variable can take data that is not normally distributed and make it more
normally distributed. This technique is often used in data with large amounts of zero responses
after adding a constant to these values. Unfortunately, what constant a researcher adds to the zero
values can affect the statistical significance of the outcome variable, as the p-value is dependent
on what constant is added (Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore, conclusions drawn from an outcome
that were arbitrarily given a constant can be inconsistent or can highlight significant differences
that do not exist (Feng et al., 2014).
A final method that has been used in the literature to analyze morality and WTO is
recoding the dependent variable dichotomously and running a logistic regression (Grasmick &
Bursik, 1990; Pogarsky, 2007). A benefit of logistic regression is that it “is widely understood
and easy to implement” (Bushway, 2013, p. 564). Although dichotomizing WTO has its
advantages, it can also be problematic because those who have any WTO are grouped together.
That is, those who report a 1% chance of offending and those who report a 99% chance of
offending are ultimately recorded in the same way — as 1s. This recoding eliminates variation in
the dependent variable which could give further insight into important heterogeneity in offender
decision-making. As Bushway (2017, p. 565) states, “the field of criminal justice would be wiser
to spend its time and energy investing in learning new techniques than in relying on logistic
regressions…”
While scholars have adapted various methodological techniques to address the zerochance phenomenon, there are limitations associated with the use of each. In addition, the
methodological choice may result in inconsistencies in substantive conclusions, which have not
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been discussed in prior literature. This study seeks to highlight the zero value responses by
employing a scenario-based methodology with a sample of undergraduate university students —
a population that is well known to produce the phenomenon. This study will then employ OLS,
tobit, log transformed, and logistic regression models to consider whether there are substantive
differences between models in the role morality plays within a RC framework.
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CHAPTER III: PRESENT STUDY
As Chapter II noted, there is a rich literature examining the effect of morality on
willingness to offend, though gaps in this literature persist in understanding how morality
moderates and mediates traditional RC constructs. Additionally, studies of morality and RC often
implement inconsistent methodologies and very little is understood about the inconsistencies this
may cause in substantive findings. This study seeks to fill these gaps in the literature by using a
scenario-based method and applying various models to test the robustness of substantive
conclusions. Specifically, the following four hypotheses will be examined:

H1: Morality will be inversely related to willingness to offend. That is, those who have a higher
morality level will be less willing to offend.
H2: There will be moderating effects of morality on RC constructs, ultimately affecting
willingness to offend. Specifically, RC constructs will have a smaller effect on willingness to
offend among those with higher morality.
H3: There will be mediating effects of morality on RC constructs, ultimately affecting
willingness to offend. Specifically, the effects of perceived certainty, severity, and benefits on
willingness to offend will be indirect through morality.
H4: There will be differences in substantive findings across analytic strategies.
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CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY
Data
The primary data collection for this study was taken from a large public southeastern
university. A survey was distributed to undergraduate classes which included a variety of majors
spanning June 2019 to February 2021. Students who completed the survey received extra credit
as an incentive for participation. Although there was an option for students to opt out of the
survey for an alternate assignment, no one selected this option.
This study utilized a fully crossed factorial design with 24 treatments surrounding a
drinking and driving scenario (see Table 1). All conditions were randomized, so each respondent
had an equal chance of receiving each version of the scenario.3 A drinking and driving vignette
was implemented, which is beneficial for this sample because it is both relevant to college
students and highly prevalent in RC studies (Grasmick & Bursik 1980, 1990; Grasmick & Green,
1981; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Pogarsky, 2002).
Although many participants in this sample are under the legal drinking age, a drinking
and driving scenario is still relevant. That is, participants aged 18-20 should not substantially
change the results, “as this group exhibits higher rates of alcohol-related risky behaviors and
slower progress in reducing these behaviors than other age groups” (Harding et al., 2016, p. 150).
Because of the culture of universities where underage drinking is prevalent (Wecshler & Kuo,

3Chi

square = 0.02 p> 0.99. This finding indicates there are no significant differences in the
number of each condition that was given to the respondents. In other words, all conditions were
successfully randomized.
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2000), many college students will find themselves in a situation similar to this scenario and will
have to make a similar decision. Therefore, even though many students are underage, they are an
ideal sample for this specific vignette.4
The scenario was presented as follows:
“Now imagine, it's about two o'clock in the morning and you have spent most
of the night drinking with friends at a local bar you come to often. You hear
the bartender yell "last call!" and you realize it's time to head home. Although
you had driven to the bar, you are now drunk and wonder if you should drive
yourself home since you didn't see any cops on the road when you drove to
the bar earlier. You consider getting a ride home so you call your friend who
is pissed you called so late because they have to work in the morning. They
say they will come and get you if you want, but it will take over an hour to get
there and you will still have to return to the next day to get your car.
Underlined are the scenario manipulations, influencing situational context, situational risk, and
situational benefit of the offense. For example, the situational context was manipulated to read:
1) “A local bar you come to often” or 2) “An unfamiliar bar.” This distinction is important
because situational context can affect a respondent’s WTO (Wikström, 2006). The type of
situational risk was also manipulated by stating that the respondent: 1) Did not see cops on the
drive in, 2) Did see the cops on the drive in, 3) Heard from a friend that there were cops on the
road, or 4) Heard on the local news of a police crackdown on drinking and driving. Finally, the
situational benefits of offending were also manipulated by indicating the respondent either: 1)
Has to make their friend angry by calling them, 2) Does not have to make their friend angry by
ordering an Uber, or 3) No option presented. Table 1 summarizes the manipulations.

4 Sensitivity tests also indicate that initial results are substantively robust to the exclusion of
those less than 21 years old.
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Table 1. Scenario Manipulations.
Situational Context
(2)
1) Local bar you come to often

Situational Risk
(3)
1) You didn't see any cops on the
road when you drove to the bar
earlier

2) Unfamiliar bar where you
met your friends for the first
time

2) Noticing a lot of cops on the
road when you were driving to the
bar earlier
3) Hearing from a friend that there
were many cops on the road that
night
4) Hearing on the local news that
there has been a police crackdown
on drinking and driving

Situational Benefit
(3)
1) You call your friend, who
is pissed you called so late
because they have to work in
the morning
2) Consider getting a ride
home, but the taxi/Uber
would be costly
3) No option presented

Sample
Of the 1,054 respondents that completed the survey, 25% were male and 75% were
female. The mean age of this sample was 22 years old, with the youngest participant being 18
and the oldest 61. The racial composition of the sample includes 59% white, 11% Black, and
22% Hispanic, with the remaining 8% comprised of Asian, Native American, and other. The
survey also asked about previous criminal histories (2% of respondents have a criminal record),
perceptions of certainty and severity, self-control, benefits of offending, and morality level.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample and all of the measures included in the
study.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (N=1,054)
Variable

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Continuous

12.29

22.42

0

100

Dichotomous

0.40

-

0

1

Logged

1.22

1.62

0

4.62

Morality

3.45

0.43

1

4

Cost Certainty

64.44

29.00

0

100

Cost Severity

8.81

2.03

0

10

Benefit Certainty

2.68

1.12

1

5

Benefit Magnitude

2.15

0.90

1

4

Situational Context

-

-

0

1

Situational Risk

-

-

0

3

Situational Benefit

-

-

0

2

Self-Control

2.87

0.37

1.39

3.77

Male

0.25

-

0

1

Black

0.13

-

0

1

Age

21.94

5.42

18

61

Income

3.64

2.20

1

9

Marital Status

0.06

0.23

0

1

Criminal Record

0.02

0.14

0

1

Willingness to Offend (WTO)

Rational Choice Constructs

Vignette Manipulations

Demographic

Measures
Dependent Variables
Willingness to Offend (WTO) was measured by asking respondents immediately
following the scenario “what do you think the chance is that you would drive yourself home in
this situation?” on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 indicates there is no chance and 100 indicates there
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is 100% chance. To enable the variety of methodologies which will be explored in this study’s
analytic plan, WTO is operationalized in three alternative ways. First, WTO is kept as a
continuous variable for OLS and tobit models (Antonaccio & Tittle, 2008; Paternoster &
Simpson, 1996). As expected, and shown in Figure 2, the distribution of this variable is
considerably skewed to the right with the majority of responses (64%) indicating there is no
willingness to offend.

Figure 2. Distribution of Continuous Willingness to Offend.

Second, WTO is log transformed with a constant of 1 (Osborne, 2002) to normalize the
distribution. Figure 3 shows the distribution of WTO after this transformation, which as
expected, is more normally distributed that the continuous variables.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Logged Willingness to Offend.

Finally, WTO is dichotomized to facilitate logistic regression (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990;
Pogarsky, 2007); those who report there is no chance they would offend are scored as “0” and
those who mark there is some willingness to offend (1-100) are scored as “1”, consistent with
prior literature (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Pogarsky, 2007). As shown in Figure 4, the
dichotomous WTO distribution shows that a majority of respondents (64%) indicated there was
no chance that they would drive home in response to the hypothetical scenario, whereas 36% of
respondents indicated there was some chance they would drive home.
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Figure 4. Distribution of Dichotomous Willingness to Offend.

Independent Variables
Morality was measured with Likert scale responses (1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree;
3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree) to several general moral questions surrounding theft (“it is
okay to steal if you need the money to feed your family…”); physical violence (“it is okay to
fight to protect yourself or someone close to you”); and selling drugs (“It is okay to sell drugs,
because if you don’t, someone else will”). These “I” statements are common in studies that
measure morality (Cochran, 2016; Gallup & Baron, 2014). A 16-item summated average scale
was created, with the scale demonstrating high internal validity (Cronbach’s  = 0.92). This
morality scale is considered a global measure of morality because it considers several crimes to
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measure a respondent’s general moral value (Herman and Pogarsky, 2020)5. Higher values
within this scale indicate increased morality. Those who report a higher morality level are
expected to report a lower WTO. Although a majority of the participants in this study show high
morality scores (greater than three; 80%), there is variation. Table A within the Appendix shows
a full list of the morality items used within each scale.
The present study also considers a series of rational choice constructs consistent with
prior literature (e.g., Loughran et al., 2016), the first of which is perceived Cost Certainty.
Perceived certainty was measured on a scale of 0 to 100 (where 0 indicates there is no chance the
respondent would be caught and 100 indicates there is a 100% chance that the respondent would
be caught) by asking respondents two questions: “What do you think the chance is that you
would be caught by the police if you chose to drive yourself home in this situation?” and “what
do you think the chance is that you would be caught by your friends, family, employer (etc.) if
you chose to drive yourself home in this situation?” A summated average of these items was then
taken (r = 0.73). Higher values of this measure indicate greater perceived certainty, and those
who report a higher certainty of being caught are expected to report a lower WTO.
The second RC construct this study considers is perceived Cost Severity (Nagin &
Paternoster, 1993), which was measured by answering respondents “how much of a problem
would it be for you if you got caught by the police?” on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 indicating “it
would be no problem at all” and 10 indicating “it would cause so many problems that I can’t
even think about it.” Respondents also answered this question regarding getting caught by their
friends/family/employer. A summated average of these items was then taken (r = 0.78). Higher

5 Findings are consistent when sensitivity checks are completed analyzing drinking and drivingspecific morality indicators (Cronbach’s  = .94). In other words, using a global moral scale in
Model 4 and drinking and driving-specific moral indicators provide virtually the same results.
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values of this measure indicate greater perceived severity. Those who report that being caught
would be more of a problem for them are expected to report a lower WTO.
The next RC constructs this study considers involve perceived benefits of offending.
Benefits of offending are measured by asking respondents how likely the benefit is to occur
(1=Very Unlikely; 2=Unlikely; 3=Neither; 4=Likely; 5=Very Likely) and how much of a benefit
it would be (1=None At All; 2=A Little; 3=More Than A Little; 4=A Lot) for several measures.
Some benefit to offending involves time and energy: “avoiding inconvenience” and “saving time
and effort because you have chosen the easiest path.” There are a few other benefits to drinking
and driving as well. Ubers and taxis are very expensive, as the scenario states, and it would be
beneficial to save money and drive home. This benefit is measured by the item, “not having to
worry about money or financial independence.” Offenders can also have beneficial feelings
while offending (Katz, 1988): “feeling a rush or high because you are doing something exciting”
and “removing the feeling that you are limited or restricted.” Another benefit of driving home is
that the respondent could leave right away and not have to wait for their angry friend to pick
them up, measured by “the convenience of not having to ask anyone for money or favors.” With
these benefits in mind, it is easy to understand the urge to drive home after drinking. A 14-item
summated scale of Benefit Certainty (how likely is the benefit to occur) and Benefit Magnitude
(how much of a benefit it would be) was created (Cronbach’s  = 0.96). Higher values of each
scale indicate higher perceived certainty and magnitude of general benefits. Those who report
higher perceived certainty and magnitude of benefits are expected to report a higher WTO.
In the drinking and driving scenario, there is Situational Context. A participant’s scenario
states that they are either 1) at a local bar they come to often, or 2) at an unfamiliar bar.
Wikström contends that “settings to action [are involved in the] perception of alternatives and
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process of choice” (Wikström, 2004, p. 8). One might feel more comfortable in a familiar bar
than in an unfamiliar bar, making them more confident in their ability to offend successfully
without apprehension, for example.
There are also Situational Benefits to driving home from the bar. Not having to return to
the bar the next morning to pick up a car is the main situational benefit of driving home, which is
held constant. There are, however, two additional situational benefits which were manipulated:
1) You call your friend, who is pissed you called so late because they have to work in the
morning; and 2) You consider getting a ride home, but the taxi/Uber would be costly. In a third
manipulation, neither of these options was presented – this third option will be the reference
category.
The final RC variable is Situational Risk, which was manipulated to include 4 conditions:
1) You didn’t see any cops on the road when you rove to the bar earlier; 2) You noticed a lot of
cops on the road when you were driving to the bar earlier; 3) You heard from a friend that there
were many cops on the road that night; and 4) You heard on the local news that there has been a
police crackdown on drinking and driving. These conditions are included as dummy variables
where no law enforcement officers serves as the reference category.
Control Variables
Demographic variables such as Age (continuous), Race/Ethnicity (1=Black; 0=Nonblack), and Sex (1=Male; 0=Female) will also be included. Self-control is also controlled for.
This variable was measured by asking respondents how frequently they behave in certain ways
such as “I plan tasks carefully”, “I am more interested in the present than the future”, and “I plan
for job security” on a scale from 1 (Rarely/Never) to 4 (Almost Always/Always) (Spinella, 2007;
also see Jaynes & Loughran, 2019). A 13-item summated average scale was then created

28

(Cronbach’s  = 0.83), where items were reverse-coded as necessary. Higher values of this scale
indicate more self-control.
I also control for Annual Household Income (1=Under $25,000; 2=$25,000 to $49,999;
3=$50,000 to $74,999; 4=$75,000 to $99,999; 5=$100,000 to $124,999; 6=$125,000 to
$149,999; 7=$150,000 to $174,999; 8=$175,000 to $199,999; 9=$200,000 or Over); Marital
Status (1= Married; 0=Married); and Criminal Record (1=Has Criminal Record; 0=Does Not
Have Criminal Record).
Analytic Strategy
I will first use an OLS model with a continuous measure of WTO to shed light on the
relationship between morality and WTO, and assess moderation and mediation effects. Within
the OLS analysis I will include variables incrementally. To examine whether morality moderates
the effect of rational choice constructs (cost certainty, cost severity, benefit certainty, benefit
magnitude, situational context, situational risk, and situational benefit) on WTO, I will include
interaction terms in the model. I will then conduct a KHB analysis (Karlson, Holm, & Breen,
2011) to investigate the mediating effects of morality on the rational choice constructs (cost
certainty, cost severity, benefit certainty, benefit magnitude, situational context, situational risk,
and situational benefit).
Then, to assess whether results are substantively robust across analytic methods, I will
use several models. First, I will use a tobit model with WTO again measured continuously,
where 0 is the censored lower limit. Second, I will use the logged dependent variable to address
non-normality. Finally, I will use a logistic regression with WTO dichotomized. These findings
will evaluate if there are any meaningful differences when compared to the OLS regression and
to one another that may be causing analytical discrepancies discussed in the literature review.
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CHAPTER V: RESULTS
Morality and Willingness to Offend
Table 3 presents analysis conducted in an iterative process, where the focal variables are
regressed onto WTO separately, and then together in a full model. The first model, Model 1,
regresses morality on WTO, controlling for a respondent’s self-control, sex, race, age, income,
marital status, and criminal history. Second, in Model 2, general RC constructs (cost certainty,
cost severity, certainty of benefits, and magnitude of benefits) are regressed on WTO. Then,
Model 3 includes the manipulated scenario variables (situational context, situational risk, and
situational benefit) regressed on WTO. Findings of each iterative model remain substantively
consistent with Model 4, therefore only the findings from Model 4 (the aggregate model) will be
discussed in depth.
The variables included in Model 4 explain 16% of the variation in offending patterns.
The results also indicate that, consistent with prior research, morality has a significant effect on a
respondent’s WTO (b = -7.58, p < 0.001), where higher levels of morality are associated with
lower willingness to drive drunk. These findings support Hypothesis 1.
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Table 3. Iterative Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models.

Coeff.

Model 1
Std. Err.

morality
-11.21***
1.61
cost certainty
--cost severity
--benefit certainty
--benefit magnitude
--situational context
Local bar
--situational risk
Saw Cops
--Heard from a Friend
--Heard on the News
--situational benefit
Angry Friend
--Uber/Taxi
--self-control
-6.59***
1.84
male
-0.37
1.57
black
2.90
2.03
age
0.09
0.16
income
-0.23
0.31
marital
-1.11
3.61
record
5.08
4.98
_cons
68.33***
7.46
Note: N= 1,054; * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 2
Coeff.
Std. Err.
--0.20***
-1.03**
1.29
1.27

Coeff.

Model 3
Std. Err.

Model 4
Coeff.
Std.
Err.
-7.58*** 1.61
-0.18*** 0.03
-0.96*
0.37
0.64
0.78
1.32
0.95

-0.03
0.38
0.77
0.96

------

------

--

--

-0.33

1.38

-0.29

1.29

----

----

0.62
-0.57
-1.65

1.90
1.91
2.01

0.64
-1.64
-2.26

1.78
1.79
1.87

0.55
2.87
-8.95***
0.97
3.65
0.04
-0.20
-2.07
4.45
36.59***

1.71
1.65
1.85
1.61
2.09
0.16
0.32
3.70
5.10
6.53

0.49
2.33
-4.58*
-2.32
0.95
0.12
-0.17
-2.57
5.24
65.54***

1.60
1.55
1.78
1.55
1.99
0.15
0.30
3.47
4.78
8.42

---6.29***
-2.22
0.86
0.10
-0.15
-3.55
4.44
44.76***
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--1.75
1.53
1.98
0.15
0.30
3.49
4.82
6.85

Perceived cost certainty is significantly associated with WTO (b = -0.18, p < 0.001),
where those who have a higher perceived certainty of apprehension are less likely to offend.
Perceived severity of punishment is also significantly associated with WTO (b = -0.96, p < 0.05)
and in the expected direction. That is, as perceived severity increases, their projected willingness
to drink and drive decreases.
General benefits of crime were not significantly related to WTO (benefit certainty: b =
0.64, p > 0.05; benefit magnitude: b = 1.32, p > 0.05), as well as situational context (local bar: b
= -0.29, p > 0.05), situational risk (saw cops: b = 0.64, p > 0.05; heard from a friend: b = -1.64,
p > 0.05; heard on the news: b = -2.26, p > 0.05) and situational benefit (angry friend b = 0.49,
p > 0.05; Uber/taxi: b = 2.33, p > 0.05).
With respect to the control variables, sex, race, age, income, marital status, and criminal
record were not significantly associated with one’s WTO. In fact, the only statistically significant
control is self-control, in the expected direction such that those who have higher levels of selfcontrol are less likely to drive home drunk (b = -4.58, p < 0.05).
Morality as a Moderator
Table 4 illustrates the moderation analysis. To facilitate interpretation of significant
findings, Figures 5 and 6 plot predicted probabilities.
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Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Coefficients with Interaction Terms to Capture Moderating
Effects of Morality on Rational Choice Constructs.
Willingness to Offend

Coef.

Std. Err.

[95% Conf.

Interval]

morality

-17.18*

8.39

-33.64

-0.73

cost certainty

-0.55**

0.21

-0.97

-0.14

cost severity

-1.88

2.59

-6.96

3.20

benefit certainty

6.82

6.54

-6.01

19.65

benefit magnitude

3.65

7.82

-11.69

19.00

situational context
Local Bar

-30.76**

10.49

-51.34

-10.17

Saw Cops

-2.28

14.67

-31.06

26.50

Cops- Heard from a Friend

-18.59

14.28

-46.60

9.43

-48.49**

15.33

-78.58

-18.39

Option Omitted

-10.47

13.21

-36.40

15.46

Uber/Taxi

22.68

12.56

-1.97

47.33

morality # cost certainty

0.11

0.06

-0.01

0.22

morality # cost severity

0.30

0.74

-0.01

0.22

morality # benefit certainty

-1.71

1.83

-5.30

1.86

morality # benefit magnitude

-0.72

2.21

-5.06

3.62

Local Bar

8.85**

3.02

2.93

14.76

Saw Cops

1.00

4.19

-7.20

9.22

Cops- Heard from a Friend

4.96

4.13

-3.14

13.06

13.50**

4.40

4.85

22.13

Option Omitted

2.94

3.77

-4.47

10.36

Uber/Taxi

-5.99

3.63

-13.12

1.15

97.86**

30.11

38.76

156.95

situational risk

Cops- Heard on the News
situational benefit

morality # situational context

morality # situational risk

Cops- Heard on the News
morality # situational benefit

_cons

Note: N= 1,054 * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p<0.001
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There is evidence that morality moderates situational context (b = 8.85, p < 0.01). Specifically,
Figure 5 illustrates that those with high morals have a similar WTO regardless of context,
however as one’s morality level decreases, they are much more likely to offend if the context is
an unfamiliar bar rather than a local bar. Morality also moderates situational risk (hearing on the
news b = 13.50, p < 0.001; Figure 6). An increase in morality has a negative effect on one’s
WTO regardless of whether they saw cops or heard about cops from a friend. However, the
negative effect of morality is weaker among those who only heard about a police presence from a
friend, rather than seeing cops for themselves. Interestingly, among those who heard about an
increase police presence on the news, there is a positive association between WTO. Notably,
among those with the lowest morals, hearing on the news that there were cops on the road had
the strongest deterrent effect across all situational risk categories. Among those with the highest
levels of morality, there was little difference in the deterrent effect of situational risk messages.
The remaining variables of interest, cost certainty, cost severity, benefit certainty, benefit
magnitude, and situational benefit (whose probability plots can be found in the appendix) were
not moderated by morality. Together, all of the moderating results partially support Hypothesis
2.
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Moderating Effects of Morality on Situational Context
50
45

Willingness to Offend
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2.5
Morality

Unfamiliar Bar

3

Local Bar

Figure 5. Moderating Effects of Morality on Situational Context.
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Moderating Effects of Morality on Situational Risk
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Willingness to Offend
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Morality

3

3.5

No Cops
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Heard from a Friend

Heard on the News

4

Figure 6. Moderating Effects of Morality on Situational Risk.

Morality as a Mediator
Table 5 shows the mediation analyses, partially supporting Hypothesis 3. 8.63% of the
effect of cost certainty on WTO was mediated by morality (b = -0.2, p < 0.001). There was no
evidence of mediating effects for severity. The remaining variables of interest, benefit certainty,
general benefit magnitude, situational context, situational risk, and situational benefit, were not
significantly mediated by morality.
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Table 5. Mediating Effects of Morality on Willingness to Offend Through Rational Choice Constructs.

Independent Variable

Indirect

Direct

Effects

Effects

b

b

% effect

Type of

mediated

mediation

cost certainty

-0.2***

-0.18***

8.63

partial

cost severity

-1.07**

-0.98**

--

none

benefit certainty

1.41

0.69

--

none

benefit magnitude

1.40

1.35

--

none

Local Bar

-0.50

-0.46

--

none

Saw Cops

0.48

0.71

--

none

Cops- Heard from a Friend

-1.38

-1.91

--

none

Cops- Heard on the News

-2.33

-2.46

--

none

Angry Friend

1.08

0.68

--

none

Uber/Taxi

3.25

2.66

--

none

situational context

situational risk

situational benefit

Examining Substantive Findings Across Alternative Methodologies
Hypothesis 4 suggests that various methodologies would result in substantive differences
across findings. Table 6 shows the results of the tobit regression (Table 6, Model 5), logged
variables (Table 6, Model 6), and logit regression (Table 6, Model 7) compared with the final
OLS model (Table 3, Model 4, also included within Table 6 for ease of reference) to assess
whether there are any substantive differences between methodological techniques.
With regards to morality and cost certainty results remain consistent across all methods.
That is, the results of morality for OLS, tobit, logged, and logit models are all statistically
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significant (p < 0.001). Similarly, benefit certainty, benefit magnitude, and context-specific
variables were consistently insignificant across methodologies. The results are also consistent for
a large majority of the control variables. In fact, the only substantive difference between the
models are the significant/non-significant effects of cost severity on the outcome variable.
Specifically, cost severity is significant in the OLS model (b = -0.96, p < 0.05), but is
insignificant in the tobit model (b = -1.31, p = 0.092), the logit model (OR = 0.99, p = 0.887), or
when logging the variable (b = -0.05, p = 0.08). However, given the number of statistical tests
conducted, this significant finding within the OLS model may have resulted from chance alone.
It is also noteworthy that across all models, the association between cost severity and offending
is consistently negative.
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Table 6. OLS, Tobit, Logged, and Logistic Results for Willingness to Drink and Drive.

Willingness to Offend

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

OLS

Tobit

Logged

Logit

Coef

Std. Err.

Coef

Std. Err.

Coef

Std. Err.

OR

Std. Err.

morality

-7.58***

1.60

-18.17***

3.44

-0.60***

0.11

0.40***

0.07

cost certainty

-0.18***

0.23

-0.51***

0.06

-0.02***

0.002

0.98***

0.003

-0.96*

0.11

-1.31

0.78

-0.05

0.03

0.99

0.04

benefit certainty

0.64

0.77

2.03

1.79

0.06

0.06

1.11

0.10

benefit magnitude

1.32

0.93

2.69

2.15

0.08

0.07

1.05

0.11

Local Bar

-0.29

1.28

-1.27

2.89

-0.06

0.09

0.91

0.13

Saw Cops

0.64

1.76

-0.61

3.97

-0.08

0.13

0.83

0.16

Cops-Heard from a Friend

-1.64

1.77

-4.21

3.98

-0.16

0.13

0.78

0.15

Cops-Heard on the News

-2.26

1.85

-4.81

4.20

-0.18

0.13

0.82

0.17

Angry Friend

0.49

1.59

0.35

3.62

0.08

0.11

1.06

0.19

Uber/Taxi

2.33

1.53

3.14

3.46

0.11

0.11

1.04

0.18

self-control

-4.58*

1.76

-13.43**

3.95

-0.38***

0.12

0.52**

0.10

male

-2.32

1.50

-5.70

3.41

-0.23

0.11

0.73

0.12

black

0.95

1.94

3.69

4.24

0.05

0.14

1.11

0.23

age

0.12

1.50

-0.05

0.35

-0.004

0.01

0.98

0.02

income

-0.17

0.29

-0.25

0.66

-0.007

0.02

0.99

0.03

marital status

-2.57

3.42

-2.92

7.94

-0.08

0.25

0.99

0.38

criminal record

5.24

4.73

14.85

10.27

0.48

0.34

2.10

1.08

65.54***

8.15

126.79***

18.76

5.83***

0.60

600.70***

571.00

cost severity

situational context

situational risk

situational benefit

_cons

Note: N= 1,054
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p<0.001
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CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION
Scholars have demonstrated the empirical relationship between morality and criminality
over the last several decades (e.g., Antonaccio & Tittle, 2008; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996;
Piquero et al., 2016) but have largely avoided discussion of morality’s role within the RC
framework. Those that have attempted to integrate morality into the RC perspective (e.g.,
Bachman et al., 1992; Jaynes & Loughran, 2019; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, 1994) have debated
the role morality should play. For example, while some have proposed that violating one’s moral
beliefs can be considered a cost of crime, having direct negative effects on willingness to offend
(Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, 1994), others have highlighted that morality may moderate the
effect of classic RC inputs (certainty, severity, benefits) on WTO (Grasmick & Green, 1980,
1981; Pogarsky, 2002; Wikström, 2004, 2006). In addition, scholars have suggested that there
may be mediating effects of morality on RC constructs (Ishoy, 2017; Svensson et al., 2013). In
other words, if the perceived certainty and severity of an offense are high, this will result in the
individual increasing their morals about committing that crime. Despite the various hypotheses
surrounding the role of morality in RC theory, scholars have rarely considered them all within a
unified framework – a key gap in the literature the present study sought to fill.
In addition, the literatures surrounding each hypothesis are largely inconsistent. One
reason for the inconsistent findings could be the various methodologies utilized. While a
majority of these studies consistently employed the vignette method to measure WTO, this often
results in a high density of zeros reflecting those that have no WTO. Scholars have attempted to
address this “zero-chance phenomenon” using diverse models, including OLS (Bachman et al.,
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1992; Cochran, 2016; Gallup & Baron, 2014), tobit (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, 1994), log
transformations (Burkett & Ward, 1993; Paternoster, Jaynes, & Wilson, 2017), and logit
regressions (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Pogarsky, 2007). While each methodology has its
strengths and weaknesses, the present study hypothesized that inconsistent findings in prior
literature may purely be the result of difference in analytic strategy. To test the empirical
relationship between morality and WTO, and evaluate if there are resulting inconsistencies, this
study sampled 1,054 young adults from a large public southeastern university and implemented a
fully crossed factorial vignette design.
The first notable finding is that there was variability in morality, supporting Hirschi’s
(1969) idea that morality is a spectrum. In fact, the data included responses within the full range:
from 0% to 100% chance that they would drive home. Consistent with prior literature (Bachman
et al., 1992; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, 1994; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Pogarsky, 2002), I
also observed the “zero-chance phenomenon” where 56% of respondents indicated they were not
willing to offend (0% chance). This descriptive result underscores the methodological concern
researchers often face when studying WTO.
With respect to morality, findings were consistent with prior literature (Gibbs, 1968;
Grasmick & Green, 1980; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, 1994) in that morality had a significant
direct negative association with WTO, where higher morality was associated with a decreased
willingness to drunk; in support of Hypothesis 1. Additionally, perceived cost certainty and
perceived cost severity were both significantly related to WTO. That is, as expected, both cost
certainty and cost severity were negatively associated with WTO — as they increased, WTO
decreased. These findings are consistent with classic deterrence and RC literature (Beccaria,
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1963; Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Tittle, 1977), which suggests that perceived cost certainty and
severity should have an inverse relationship with criminal behavior.
With respect to benefits, neither benefit certainty nor benefit magnitude were
significantly related to a person’s willingness to drive drunk. This is surprising given that
literature suggests perceived benefits have a positive relationship with one’s WTO (Cornish &
Clarke, 1986; Katz, 1999; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993). It is possible that a scale of general
benefits does not accurately predict a person’s WTO for a specific context. In this sense, it is
possible that only specific forms of benefits influence this form of offending. This notion is
consistent with theorists who emphasize the situational nature of offending (Cornish & Clarke,
1986; Wikström, 2006).
Context-specific variables (situational context, risk, and benefit), however, were not
significantly associated with WTO. This is not completely surprising and should not be taken as
contradicting the above situational emphasis. These results contribute to the mixed findings of
contextual variables in previous literature (Barton-Crosby & Hirtenlehner, 2020; Pauwels,
Svensson, & Hirtenlehner, 2018). Although Pogarsky (2002) and Wikström (2004) state that
context should matter, one should not call this finding unsupportive of their theories: Wikström’s
concept of a two-step decision-making process claims a person who identifies crime as a viable
option will experience the inputs of RC. However, those who do not see an offense as an action
will not experience the RC decision-making process. It is possible that context is considered as
part of the decision-making process only after a criminal action is identified as possible.
Therefore, those with high morals do not consider context because they do not consider
committing the crime in the first place. Those with low morals, however, might not perceive
context as part of the decision-making process; it is possible that the threat of formal sanctions,
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and formal sanctions only, influence those with low morals. Taken together, context-specific
variables may only have an effect for some individuals, in line with a moderating hypothesis.
Although I expected to find moderating effects of morality on RC constructs, there were
no significant moderation effects morality on cost certainty and cost severity. These null findings
are partially unsupportive of Wikström’s claims. If Wikström is correct, we would have found
moderating effects of morality on perceived cost certainty and severity, where those with high
morals do not consider these costs. One explanation for this null finding is the particular sample
used for this study. Specifically, all students — regardless of morality level — would face severe
consequences if apprehended and punished for drunk driving, potentially resulting in failed
classes, loss of student status, and even loss of scholarships. These penalties become harsher
when we factor in general financial instability and lack of career experience among most college
students. Additionally, the chances of being apprehended may be higher for a student sample
because warnings may be more explicitly stated via general campus communications about
alcohol consumption during sporting events. On campus student residents may also have stricter
rules about alcohol possession within the dorm rooms, regardless of legal/illegal age. In sum, it is
possible that the threat of apprehension and penalties are so great for students specifically that
everyone is deterred regardless of morality level. There were also no moderating effects of
morality on general benefits, but since general benefits did not predict WTO, it is unsurprising
that we find no moderating effects.
Consistent with a moderating hypothesis, results show that morality moderates situational
context such that those with higher morals have a similar low WTO regardless of the type of bar,
and those with lower morals report more WTO when in an unfamiliar bar. This result is
interesting for a few reasons. First, perhaps being in an unfamiliar bar reminds the respondent
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that they are not in a familiar place, and they do not know anyone in the area, making them more
comfortable offending. On the other hand, drunk driving home from an unfamiliar bar poses a
more difficult time in actually getting home. In other words, someone with high morals in an
unfamiliar bar is less willing to drive drunk because the route home is different, and it is much
easier to drive home after drinking if the respondent is familiar with directions home.
Morality also moderates situational risk such that high morals had a negative effect on
WTO for those who saw no cops, saw cops, or heard from a friend about a police presence. In
fact, not seeing cops and seeing cops on the way to the bar had similar effects of morality on
WTO. These similar scores of WTO might be a simple case of common sense: if an individual
saw cops on the road on the way to the bar, they might assume that the patrolmen are no longer
there several hours later (Pogarsky & Piquero, 2003). Another explanation is that there is an
omnipresent perception of police presence regardless of actually seeing police cars in the area. In
other words, there could be a sustained belief that there is continuous police presence, so
increasing police appearances or decreasing them will have no effect on deterrence (Buck, Gross,
Hakim, & Weinblatt, 1983; Kleck & Barnes, 2014).
The negative effect of morality was weaker for those who heard about police presence
from a friend. One explanation for this is that morality has less of an effect on WTO when the
information came from a friend who, according to psychological literature of social group
dynamics, have similar beliefs about crime and the law (Chen, Pillutla, & Yao, 2009). Another
explanation is the idea of Bayesian updating, or vicarious information transfer. That is, people
learn new information and change their perceptions based on other people’s experiences (Gioia
& Manz, 1985; Holt & Smith, 2009; Jaffray, 1992; Park & Puranam, 2020; Wilson, Paternoster,
& Loughran, 2016). In fact, some scholars even suggest that indirect information transfer like
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this is more influential than direct experience in forming beliefs (Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Then,
it may be that people’s perceptions of risk were increased by the information of others, relying
less on their morality to guide them through the decision-making process.
The most interesting aspect of the risk information transmission, however, is the positive
association between morality and WTO when one hears about police presence from the news.
While high levels of morality result in a consistently low likelihood of offending regardless of
the type of messaging (if there are police at all), among those with the lowest levels of morality,
the policing message that seems to be the most influential is hearing on the news. It is possible
that the language used for the scenario manipulations regarding situational risk accounts for this
positive association. For example, perhaps a “police crackdown” is perceived as more serious
than a general police presence among those with low morals. Taken together, then, these
moderating results suggest that morality does not moderate generalized cost certainty, severity,
and benefits, and instead provide support for a context-specific decision-making process, which
is consistent with Wikström’s theory in that key importance is placed in situational factors
(2004, 2006).
This study also analyzed the mediating effects of morality. Morality mediated 8.63% of
costs certainty’s effect on WTO, resulting in a partial mediation, but perceived severity was not
mediated by morality at all. These findings suggest that the severity of the punishment does not
shape moral beliefs, but the probability of receiving punishment of any kind does. These findings
are consistent with early deterrence literature (Antunes & Hunt, 1973; Beccaria, 1963, p. 58)
which states that “one of the greatest curbs on crime is not the cruelty of punishments, but their
infallibility…”, as well as more recent literature testing this idea (Ishoy, 2017; Svensson et al.,
2013). This finding is also consistent with the idea that a child can develop high morals if
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parental units and schools monitor their behavior carefully and correct behavior that is wrong.
Additionally, the adult criminal justice system can deter offenders by focusing on increasing
certainty of offending, rather than focusing on more punitive measures. In fact, a passage in
Zimring and Hawkins’s Deterrence (1973, p. 161) states that “…if punishment could be made
certain almost all crime would be eliminated.” This finding suggests the effect of certainty is not
only direct, but also influential because of its moral signaling. Mediation effects were not
observed for cost severity, benefit certainty, benefit magnitude, situational context, situational
risk, or situational benefit.
Hypothesis 4 stated there would be substantive differences in results across various
methodologies, which would explain the inconsistent findings in prior literature. Interestingly,
there were no substantive differences in most effects of the variables across analytic strategies. In
fact, the only substantive difference found across model types was the significant/non-significant
effect of cost severity on WTO, which could have resulted from chance alone given the number
of statistical tests conducted or due to the constant that was added prior to logging the variable
(Feng et al., 2014), rather than a true, meaningful difference across models. Given the similar
findings across various models, it seems that differences in analytic methodology are not
responsible for inconsistent findings in prior literature. Together these findings do not lend
support to Hypothesis 4.
What, then, accounts for the inconsistent findings? One explanation is the specific
scenario that is chosen for studies that utilize a vignette methodology. Differing crime types
might result in different distributions of WTO, ultimately altering any predictive effects of the
independent variables. For example, among morality and deterrability-focused studies, vignettes
addressed sexual assault (Bachman et al., 1992), corporate crime (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993;
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Paternoster & Simpson, 1996), and drug use (Gallup & Baron, 2014); although drunk driving is
the most frequently applied (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Paternoster et al., 2017; Pogarsky,
2002). Differences in findings may also be due to differences in sample composition. For
instance, Gallup and Baron’s (2014) study sampled homeless youths, Bachman and colleagues
(1992) sampled only college males, and Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) study sampled
graduate students only.
Differences in findings may also be due to measurement differences. For example, Nagin
& Paternoster (1993) used social shame as a direct cost to measure morality, whereas Paternoster
et al. (2017) used the dictator and ultimatum game results as indicators of other-regarding
preferences, and Pogarsky (2002) used a measure of social disapproval. None of these concepts
directly measure morality; although an argument can be made about morality subsuming these
concepts in its definition, any differences in interpretation could account for the mixed findings
between morality’s role in predicting WTO. Determining what accounts for differing findings in
prior literature is a daunting task when measures, samples, and analytic strategies represent
opportunities to diverge from prior methodology; these are all key directions for future research.
While this study was primarily framed within a RC context, the findings have theoretical
implications outside of this theory. First, my findings are generally supportive of Wikström’s
(2004) situational action theory (SAT). Although context did not directly impact WTO, context
seemed to matter among people who identify crime as an option. Because “perception
alternatives and the process of choice [does] not rest fully in either the individual or the setting
but emerge from the interaction between the two” (Wikström, 2004, p. 9), for those with high
morals, their level of morality nullifies any effect from the setting or context. So, although we
did not find a direct effect of context on WTO, SAT is still theoretically supported. It is
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important to note, however, that I did not find interaction effects among morality and generalized
rational choice constructs (certainty, severity, benefits). This suggests that the moderating effects
in Wikström’s theory are largely situational rather than general.
Second, findings of this study were not only supportive of RC theory and SAT, but also
supportive and applicable to other criminological theories as well, such as Akers’ (1998) social
learning theory (SLT). For example, cost certainty was partially mediated by morality such that a
higher perceived likelihood of “being caught” was associated with increased morality where one
views a high perceived certainty as reflective of something for which you should be caught. This
idea is consistent with “definitions” within SLT, where experiences and interactions shape a
person’s positive or negative definition about an offense. Those who perceive certainty of
apprehension to be high will form negative definitions toward that offense and should have a low
WTO. Likewise, if a person perceives certainty of apprehension to be low, perhaps because of
parents or peers that condone deviant behavior, then they may think an action is “not that bad” or
is more moral than actions that have a higher certainty of apprehension. This would then shape
their definition of this action to be favorable. This differential association (Akers, 1998) will in
turn reinforce the definitions conducive to criminal behavior. Moreover, the general idea that
costs and benefits influence decision making is consistent with Akers’ (1990) notion of
differential reinforcement.
Finally, results of this study have implications for control theories more broadly.
Take, for example, the finding that morality is indeed a significant predictor of offending is in
line with Hirschi’s (1969) notion of belief as an element of the social bond. In addition, findings
that informal sanction certainty and severity (within the general certainty and severity measures)
are associated with offending are consistent with Becker’s (1960, p. 35) notions of “side-bets” or
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social institutions/relationships being perceived as valuable and deterring offending (see also
Sampson and Laub, 1993). Mediating findings are also consistent with Becker’s (1960, p. 36)
idea of “generalized cultural expectations” where society/culture (which determine sanction
certainty and severity through allocation of resources) shape a person’s morality; once a behavior
or set of expectations is formed (morality), then behavior becomes consistent to maintain that set
of expectations, ultimately acting as controls.
This study had several limitations. First, the sample was comprised only of college
students within a specific region, which is not necessarily generalizable for populations in
different regions (or the country as a whole) or different age groups. As previously stated,
however, this sampling frame was intentionally selected because of its prevalence in prior
literature (Grasmick & Green, 1981; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Pogarsky, 2002). Second, only
one crime type was used for this study, eliminating any heterogeneity in WTO across differing
crime types. While this crime is also the most commonly applied scenario within offender
decision-making research (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Paternoster et al., 2017; Pogarsky, 2002),
likely due to the frequent use of student samples, it is unknown whether findings would be
consistent across scenarios. It is also possible that different crime types/scenario manipulations
would result in different degrees of “the zero-chance phenomenon.” Additionally, because this
study was cross-sectional, there might be mediating effects in a different causal ordering than
what was analyzed, reported, and theoretically hypothesized, where morality may influence
sanction perceptions. Future studies should investigate all mediating possibilities using
longitudinal data. Further, the lack of standardization among coefficients precludes the reader
from directly comparing the effects of each independent variable; this would have been
particularly helpful when comparing methodologies to further investigate the potential
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differences between analytical models and is a direction for future research. A final limitation of
this study is the low r-squared, specifically that only 16% of the variability among the dependent
variable is explained by the variables included in the final model (Table 3, Model 4). Although
this number is common among micro-level research focusing on individuals (rather than the
macro level), there is 84% unexplained variance. Alternative variables or stronger measures
should be considered in future research to try and close the gap between unexplained and
explained variance.
Despite these limitations, this study presented a strong test of the empirical relationship
between morality and offending within a RC context. First, this study offers a comprehensive
examination of morality’s effects in a direct, moderating, and mediating fashion. Also, not only
is this study the first of its kind to measure morality’s mediating effects directly on perceived
cost certainty rather than using parallel measures like parental monitoring, but it is also one of
the first to investigate the mediating effects of morality on benefits of any type. This study lays
the groundwork for future studies to move past a deterrence framework to test morality’s effect
on offending and to further question what accounts for inconsistent findings in prior literature.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES AND FIGURES
Table A1. Items Included in Study Scales.
Morality (Cronbach’s = 0.92)
1. It is okay to steal if you need the money to feed your family, to pay rent, or to help a friend
2. It is okay to steal because if you don’t, someone else will
3. It is okay to steal as long as you are not physically hurting anyone
4. It is okay to steal from someone who is rich and can afford to lose it
5. Stealing a little bit of money is not too serious because others steal a lot more
6. It is okay to steal from an unlocked car if the owner is not responsible enough to lock their car
7. It is okay to steal to teach someone a lesson
8. It is okay to drive while intoxicated if you cannot afford an Uber
9. It is okay to drive while intoxicated if you have done it many times and never hurt anyone
10. It is okay to drive while intoxicated in order to prevent bothering any of your family members or
friends to pick you up
11. It is okay to fight to protect yourself or someone close to you
12. It is okay to fight if someone disrespects you or someone close to you
13. It is okay to sell drugs because it is not really harming anyone
14. It is okay to sell drugs if it is your only way to make money
15. It is okay to sell drugs because if you don’t, someone else will
16. It is okay to sell drugs because using them isn’t that bad
Perceived Certainty of Getting Caught (r = 0.73)
1. What do you think the chance is that you would be caught by the police if you chose to drive
yourself home in this situation?
2. What do you think the chance is that you would be caught by your friends, family, employer
(etc.) if you chose to drive yourself home in this situation?
Perceived Severity of Getting Caught (r = 0.78)
1. How much of a problem would it be for you if you got caught by the police?
2. How much of a problem would it be for you if you got caught by your friends, family, employer
(etc.)?
Certainty of Offending Benefits (Cronbach’s = 0.96)
1. Feeling a rush or “high” because you are getting away with something wrong
2. Feeling a rush or “high” because you are doing something exciting
3. Feeling in control or powerful
4. Feeling a sense of confidence
5. Feeling free
6. Feeling independent or self-sufficient
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Table A1 Continued. Items included in Study Scales.
7. Feeling energetic and youthful
8. Feeling a sense of excitement
9. The convenience of not having to ask anyone for money or favors
10. Freedom to be or do whatever you want
11. Saving time and effort because you have chosen the easiest path
12. Not having to worry about money or financial independence
13. Avoiding inconvenience
14. Removing the feeling that you are limited or restricted
Severity of Offending Benefits (Cronbach’s = 0.96)
1. Feeling a rush or “high” because you are getting away with something wrong
2. Feeling a rush or “high” because you are doing something exciting
3. Feeling in control or powerful
4. Feeling a sense of confidence
5. Feeling free
6. Feeling independent or self-sufficient
7. Feeling energetic and youthful
8. Feeling a sense of excitement
9. The convenience of not having to ask anyone for money or favors
10. Freedom to be or do whatever you want
11. Saving time and effort because you have chosen the easiest path
12. Not having to worry about money or financial independence
13. Avoiding inconvenience
14. Removing the feeling that you are limited or restricted
Self-Control (Cronbach’s = 0.83)
1. I plan tasks carefully
2. I do things without thinking
3. I don’t “pay attention”
4. I concentrate easily
5. I save money on a regular basis
6. I am a careful thinker
7. I plan for job security
8. I say things without thinking
9. I act “on impulse”
10. I get easily bored when solving thought problems
11. I act on the spur of the moment
12. I am more interested in the present than the future
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Figure A. Moderating Effects of Morality on Cost Certainty.
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Figure B. Moderating Effects of Morality on Cost Severity.
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Figure C. Moderating Effects of Morality on Situational Benefit.
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Figure D. Moderating Effects of Morality on Benefit Certainty.
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